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”I’ve seen Plato’s cups and table, but not his cupness and tableness.” (109) 1
Before we begin, we should admit that the purpose of what is to follow is
not to argue for a radically new ontology concerning objects. Instead, our hope
is to identify the boundaries of what it is we are speaking of when we speak of
such things2 as an object. An object contains a multiplicity of somethingness,
in different modalities. We perceive an object, we describe it using language, we
manipulate it physically, and we ascribe uses or ends to them. We understand
intuitively that all of these must be related in some sense, as they cohere onto
the same object.
I define seepage as a property of improperly bound things, that is our def-
initions and parameters of a particular thing do not immediately exhaust the
properties of that thing. Even if we can define a thing sufficiently to be prag-
matic in our usage of language, that does not mean our definition can manage
to grasp fully the properties of said thing. In a sudden dramatic event, seepage
can occur to something – something novel and informative seeps through the
thing and presents itself, a property reveals itself that only now seems inherent
to that object. In a sense, the boundary of what constitutes that thing has
become permeable while at the same time still being clear. I will call this the
permeable structure, a boundary which allows for seepage but still maintains
the skeletal shape of the thing we’re speaking of.
Let’s call that skeletal shape the matrix of the thing. The nature of that
matrix is perhaps related to the question of universals – but that is beyond
the scope of this paper. Our motivation for denoting this matrix is to allow
us to maintain the intuition of some property which connects things together
while stressing that things exhibit properties outside of that matrix. The apple
as an object is united by a matrix which defines it as an apple, whether the
apple has been crushed, rotten, or baked into a pie. Even though properties
could seep through the boundaries of that apple to the point of the apple being
1Herakleitos and Diogenes. Trans. Guy Davenport
2I distinguish things from objects to make clear a distinction between a discrete physical
form we recognize as an object and the greater ‘world’ of things which includes objects. This
distinction will be of some importance later.
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unrecognizable, we still speak of those properties as belonging to the apple we’re
speaking of – the apple has not lost its appleness.
Of course, the matrix of a thing by definition does not consist of the entirety
of the thing. The entirety of an object’s properties – how we experience it,
how we think of it, its social and cultural significance, its myriad of uses –
often appears to be larger than our immediate definition of that object. A
pupil, Anscombe, raises an important question: “is this a physical property
of all objects?” The answer is not immediately obvious. Some objects exhibit
much less seepage than others. On one extreme sit objects such as elementary
particles, holding a limited set of properties which make its definition rigorous
and rigid. On the other extreme sit things such as air, which prima facie seems
capable of holding almost any property. This distance between an object’s
matrix and the entirety of its possible properties as a physical thing is therefore
not entirely a matter of perspective or psychology.
We should also note that these properties not only have a system of relations
to the frame of the object we’re speaking of, but also to other properties. The
most obvious system of relations between properties is analogous to some basic
operations in set theory. Some properties are physical, like our understanding
of a statue as being heavy. In contrast, calling the statue beautiful describes a
qualitative experiences involving the object. Some properties can co-exist, many
objects can be heavy, tall, and round; some properties cannot, as it would be
hard for a lamp to be both on and off. Some properties relate to one another in a
manner analogous to a partially ordered set, one property leads to another – for
a physical object to possess a change in momentum, something must act upon
it. There are also many properties which are dependent on a parent property,
as it would be difficult for something to taste bitter if it did not also a taste to
begin with.3
To say that culture and the skeletal shapes of objects that accompany us in
the world share a close historical bond should not be controversial. Heidegger
raised this point in his discussion of technology, writing that: ”enframing4 means
the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges
him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve5.”
(9) 6 It is the properties that objects reveal which challenges the enterprising
human to engage with it. Technology in its most basic form begins with the
bringing-forth of properties from the matrix of objects, exploiting the seepage
and bringing purpose to what becomes revealed. The discovery of the utility of
fire by early Homo was the transformation of a dangerous physical phenomena
to an malleable object with a purpose beyond merely existing, and the same
process applies to early tools like sticks and stones. The culture of objects,
technology’s mother, gives matter a frame of existence necessary to allow an
existence as an object in our world of things. This culture of objects reveals a
3The importance of these relations will be appreciated later on in this paper.
4Gestell, a gathering together of properties which reveals a way of being seen and under-
stood in the world
5An object with properties now revealed by technological activity
6Heidegger, M. (1977) The Question Concerning Technology.
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tension between our understanding of the object and the physical medium it is
carried by, as the mere matrix of an object is insufficient for a culture of objects
which holds enframing as one of its modes of existence.
2 Information is Information
”Information is information, not matter or energy.” (132) 7
The world which we speak of consists of things8, but an object should be
defined as more than simply a thing. An object includes properties, as we’ve
described previously, and relations to other objects determined by the possibil-
ities within them. Put more succinctly, ”objects contain the possibility of all
states of affairs.” (31)9 Holding our previous discussion of seepage in mind, we
can see that the enframing of objects, taking as an example puzzle pieces, allow
separate objects to hold relations with each other which reveal unique properties
together that their entirely separate matrix forms do not posses. The puzzle
pieces do not reveal their representation when they are apart, but begin to put
them together with the intent of bringing-forth the representation and you’ll
see the process of seepage gradually emerge from your activity. This represen-
tation is information in the purest sense, a reduction in the uncertainty of our
understanding w/r/t the object and its properties10.
Information thusly can be defined as a change, not a change in matter or
energy, but a change in how objects are organized and what this organization
reveals about the objects in question. Any change in organization can reduce
the uncertainty w/r/t the properties of the object in question, whether we speak
of moving the object (its organization in space) or simply comparing the objects
to other objects we can speak of. Our critique of object ontology must thus also
address any inattention to the organization of objects, wherever it may occur, as
no description of the properties of objects can be complete without addressing
information. We can provide here two intuitive examples – water and dominoes.
Water itself is described as an object, but to be more specific what we call
water is instead an organization of objects with very specific properties present
only due to how said objects behave together. The shape of water, its taste, its
appearance are best understood as a property of objects working together rather
than the property of one specific H20 object. This seems a trivial observation
at first, but it is useful when stressing the importance of organization as part
of a viable object ontology. Change is how we understand the properties of an
object, since the properties which inform us of the object must by our definition
7Wiener, N. (1948) Cybernetics
8Here we could misread Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and proclaim ”1.1 the world is the to-
tality of facts, not of things.” (29)
9Wittgenstein, L. (1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
10To quote Shannon, ”the first defining expression has already been interpreted as the
amount of information sent less the uncertainty of what was sent.” (22) Shannon, C.E. (1948)
A Mathematical Theory of Communication. For a formal definition of uncertainty, refer to
Shannon’s paper beginning at pg. 10.
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reduce some measure of uncertainty. This change is alluded to by Heidegger,
who speaks of ”a way of being seen” being revealed and understood in the world.
That gathering of properties is its organization, indeed enframing itself should
be described as a change in organization – one which transforms water from a
collection of objects to a vital resource.
Addressing our second example, dominoes, we mean to say a mechani-
cal computer built from dominoes11. This computer carries out an operation
through intricately placed dominoes, which perform as transistors do the vital
operations required by a computer. This is not done through any inherent prop-
erties of dominoes – plastic dominoes cannot perform operations, nor amplify or
switch electrical current between terminals. Computation on a domino comput-
er is instead done by arranging the dominoes across a floor, with the appropriate
gate operations (AND, XOR, etc.) accomplished using intricate positioning.
Anscombe interjects: ”if the computation occurs because of how the domi-
noes are arranged, does the computer need to be built out of dominoes?” The
answer is no. One can find out for themselves that computers can be with some
effort built out of many materials, not just silicone or dominoes, and in the
case of the computers built within Minecraft12 these materials need not even
be physical. What is crucial about the computers discussed is not the physical
properties of the medium with which they are built, but rather how an informa-
tive change in the representation of something13 is performed using them. The
state of a computer is a property of the computer itself, not of the dominoes
which it consists of, yet the entirety of the computer’s matter is limited to the
dominoes. The computer is a physical object, but one that only exists so long as
the dominoes are organized in a manner which allows for computation to seep
through the boundaries of its constituent parts. Remove enough dominoes and
you’ll watch the object itself cease to exist, cease to be informative or revealing,
even though the physical properties of the dominoes do not change.
The connection drawn here between water and the domino computer might
appear tenuous, as they share few properties and seem to inhabit entirely dif-
ferent worlds. The comparison is meant to illustrate the importance of organi-
zation when considering the properties of objects, and to give us two different
approaches to understanding what it means for properties to be informative.
Anscombe asks: ”should we draw the rather obvious conclusion that a lot of
objects are actually made of smaller objects?” What is of interest is not that
objects consist of smaller objects, but rather that the properties of the objects
in question are more than the totality of the properties of its constituent parts.
This is true not only when thinking of the chemical composition of substances,
but also when considering objects on scales much larger than the basic elements
of the periodic table – perhaps a property of all objects no matter the scale.
11See standupmaths, ”The 10,000 Domino Computer.”
12Please do see: https://minecraft.net/en-us/article/deep-thought
13The most important principle of computation is change. If there is no change from state
to another, there is no computation.
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3 Percolation
”The seepage or filtration of a liquid through a porous substance.”
We’ve discussed two aspects of our critique of ontology. We began with a
discussion of seepage, the process of properties revealing themselves from the
matrix forms of an object. From this discussion came the observation that
these properties often have their own system of relations, and we placed this in
the context of a culture of objects which engages with this revealing process.
What followed was an argument for considering organization as the principle
which allows for seepage, which must be understood as an inherently informative
process. This should be intuitive – whenever the organization of objects reveals
some property, we learn something new and are less uncertain about the object.
What motivates this project is a need to move away from fixating on the object
and its physical properties when asking what it means for an object to reveal
itself; to show ”a way of being seen.” We wish to consider an object to be a
continual process14where the properties represented by the organization of its
constituent parts change as they seep beyond its matrix. An object cannot
inform us of all of its properties immediately, rather we acquaint ourselves with
them15as they are brought forth and becoming enframed as part of how we
understand said object. The apple doesn’t reveal its taste until we taste it, the
water doesn’t show its shape until we can see how it moves, etc.
As we admitted from the start, the purpose of this paper was not to establish
and defend a new ontology. Our hope is instead to tease out some properties
which will allow us to approach object ontology as a process, arguing for an
understanding of objects not as rooted in the physical presence of a thing but
as a continual interplay between things which realize relations on many levels.
Future discussions should address the following16:
• The relationship between our senses and our ability to perceive properties
as seeping forth from the boundaries of objects.
• The criteria which distinguish objects exhibiting low seepage from objects
exhibiting high seepage.
• Addressing realist versus idealist positions on the nature of relations be-
tween and within objects.
• A more in-depth discussion on the process of organization and how prop-
erties emerge from that process.
14The work of A.N. Whitehead is motivated by a similar ambition, and deserves a closer
look.
15Care must be taken to separate this process from our own process of learning, the relations
between objects as we described stand before we become acquainted with them as the domino
computer and the water are subject to change whether or not we perceive them.
16Many thanks to Magdolin Vartanian and Eric Bracht for their helpful feedback.
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